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Abstract
The popularity of social networking sites has attracted billions of users to engage and share their
information on these networks. The vast amount of circulating data and information expose these networks
to several security risks. Social engineering is one of the most common types of threat that may face social
network users. Training and increasing users’ awareness of such threats is essential for maintaining
continuous and safe use of social networking services. Identifying the most vulnerable users in order to
target them for these training programs is desirable for increasing the effectiveness of such programs. Few
studies have investigated the effect of individuals’ characteristics on predicting their vulnerability to social
engineering in the context of social networks. To address this gap, the present study developed a novel
model to predict user vulnerability based on several perspectives of user characteristics. The proposed
model includes interactions between different social network-oriented factors such as level of involvement
in the network, motivation to use the network, and competence in dealing with threats on the network.
The results of this research indicate that most of the considered user characteristics are factors that
influence user vulnerability either directly or indirectly. Furthermore, the present study provides evidence
that individuals’ characteristics can identify vulnerable users so that these risks can be considered when
designing training and awareness programs.
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Introduction
Individuals and organisations are becoming increas-
ingly dependent on working with computers, acces-
sing the Internet, and more importantly sharing data
through virtual communications. This makes cyberse-
curity one of today’s most significant issues. Protect-
ing people and organisations from being targeted by
cybercriminals is becoming a priority for industry and
academia (Gupta et al. 2018). This is due to the sub-
stantial damage that may result from losing valuable
data and documents in such attacks. Rather than
exploiting technical means to reach their victims,
cybercriminals may instead use deceptive social engin-
eering (SE) strategies to convince their targets to
accept the lure. Social engineers exploit individuals
motives, habits, and behaviour to manipulate their
victims (Mitnick and Simon 2003).
Often, security practitioners still rely on technical
measures to protect from online threats while over-
looking the fact that cybercriminals are targeting hu-
man weak points to spread and conduct their attacks
(Krombholz et al. 2015). According to the human-
factor report (Proofpoint 2018), the number of social
engineering attacks that exploit human vulnerabilities
dramatically increased over the year examined. This
raises the necessity of finding a solution that helps
the user toward acceptable defensive behaviour in the
social network (SN) setting. Identifying the user char-
acteristics that make them more or less vulnerable to
social engineering threats is a major step toward pro-
tecting against such threats (Albladi and Weir 2018).
Knowing where weakness resides can help focus
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awareness-raising and target training sessions for
those individuals, with the aim of reducing their likely
victimisation.
With such objectives in mind, the present research de-
veloped a conceptual model that reflects the extent to
which the user-related factors and dimensions are inte-
grated as a means to predict users’ vulnerability to social
engineering-based attacks. This study used a scenario-
based experiment to examine the relationships between
the behavioural constructs in the conceptual model and
the model’s ability to predict user vulnerability to SE
victimisation.
The organisation of this paper is as follows: Theor-
etical background section briefly analyses the related
literature that was considered in developing the pro-
posed model. The methods used to evaluate this
model are described in Methods section. Following
this, the results of the analysis are summarised in Re-
sults section. Discussion section provides a discussion
of the findings while Theoretical and practical impli-
cations section presents the theory and practical im-
plications. An outline approach to a semi-automated
advisory system is proposed in A semi-automated se-
curity advisory system section. Finally, Conclusion
section draws conclusions from this work.
Theoretical background
People’s vulnerability to cyber-attacks, and particularly
to social engineering-based attacks, is not a newly emer-
ging problem. Social engineering issues have been stud-
ied in email environments (Alseadoon et al. 2015; Halevi
et al. 2013; Vishwanath et al. 2016), organisational envi-
ronments (Flores et al. 2014, 2015), and recently in so-
cial network environments (Algarni et al. 2017; Saridakis
et al. 2016; Vishwanath 2015). Yet, the present research
argues that the context of these exploits affects peoples’
ability to detect them, and that the influences create new
characteristics and elements which warrant further
investigation.
The present study investigated user characteristics
in social networks, particularly Facebook, from differ-
ent angles such as peoples’ behaviour, perceptions,
and socio-emotions, in an attempt to identify the fac-
tors that could predict individuals’ vulnerability to SE
threats. People’s vulnerability level will be identified
based on their response to a variety of social engin-
eering scenarios. The following sub-sections will ad-
dress in detail the relationship between each factor of
the three perspectives and user susceptibility to SE
victimisation.
Habitual perspective
Due to the importance of understanding the impact of
peoples’ habitual factors on their susceptibility to SE in
SNs, this study aims to measure the effect of level of in-
volvement, number of SN connections, percentage of
known friends among the network’s connections, and
SN experience on predicting user susceptibility to SE in
the conceptual model.
Level of involvement
This construct is intended to measure the extent to
which a user engages in Facebook activities. When
people are highly involved with a communication
service, they tend to be relaxed and ignore any cues
associated with such service that warn of deception
risk (Vishwanath et al. 2016). User involvement in a
social network can be measured by the number of
minutes spent on the network every day and the fre-
quency of commenting on other people’s status up-
dates or pictures (Vishwanath 2015). Time spent on
Facebook is positively associated with disclosing
highly sensitive information (Chang and Heo 2014).
Furthermore, people who are more involved in the
network are believed to be more exposed to social
engineering victimisation (Saridakis et al. 2016;
Vishwanath 2015).
Conversely, highly involved users are supposed to
have more experience with the different types of
threat that could occur online. Yet, it has been ob-
served that active Facebook users are less concerned
about sharing their private information as they usu-
ally have less restrictive privacy settings (Halevi
et al. 2013). Users’ tendency to share private infor-
mation could relate to the fact that individuals who
spend a lot of time using the network usually exhibit
high trust in the network (Sherchan et al. 2013).
Therefore, the following hypotheses have been
proposed.
 Ha1. Users with a higher level of involvement will
be more susceptible to social engineering attacks
(i.e., there will be a positive relationship).
◦ Hb1. The user’s level of involvement positively
influences the user’s experience with cybercrime.
◦ Hb2. The user’s level of involvement positively
influences the user’s trust.
Number of connections
Despite of the fact that having large number of SN
connections could increase people’s life satisfaction if
they are motivated to engage in the network to
maintain friendships (Rae and Lonborg 2015), this
high number of contacts in the network is claimed
to increase vulnerability to online risks (Buglass
et al. 2016; Vishwanath 2015). Risky behaviour such
as disclosing personal information in Facebook is
closely associated with users’ desire to maintain and
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increase the number of existing friends (Chang and
Heo 2014; Cheung et al. 2015). Users with a high
number of social network connections are motivated
to be more involved in the network by spending
more time sharing information and maintaining their
profiles (Madden et al. 2013).
Furthermore, a high number of connections might
suggest that users are not only connected with their
friends but also with strangers. Vishwanath (2015)
has claimed that connecting with strangers on Face-
book can be considered as the first level of cyber-
attack victimisation, as those individuals are usually
less suspicious of the possible threats that can result
from connecting with strangers in the network. Fur-
thermore, Alqarni et al. (2016) have adopted this
view to test the relationship between severity and
vulnerability of phishing attacks and connection with
strangers (as assumed to present the basis for
phishing attacks). Their study indicated a negative
relationship between the number of strangers that
the user is already connected to and the user’s per-
ception of the severity and their vulnerability to
phishing attacks in Facebook. Therefore, if users are
connected mostly with known friends on Facebook,
this could be seen as a mark of less vulnerable indi-
viduals. With all of these points in mind, the follow-
ing hypotheses are generated.
 Ha2: Users with a higher number of connections
will be more susceptible to social engineering attacks
(i.e., there will be a positive relationship).
◦ Hb3: The user’s number of connections
positively influences the user’s level of
involvement.
 Ha3: Users with higher connections with known
friends will be less susceptible to social engineering
attacks (i.e., there will be a negative relationship).
Social network experience
People’s experience in using information communica-
tion technologies makes them more competent to
detect online deception in SNs (Tsikerdekis and
Zeadally 2014). For instance, it has been found that
the more time elapsed since joining Facebook makes
the user more capable of detecting SE attacks
(Algarni et al. 2017). Furthermore, despite the fact
that some researchers argue that computer experience
has no significant impact on their phishing suscepti-
bility (Halevi et al. 2013; Saridakis et al. 2016), other
research on email phishing found positive impact
from number of years of using the Internet and num-
ber of years of using email on people’s detection abil-
ity with email phishing (Alseadoon 2014; Sheng et al.
2010). Therefore, the present study suggests that the
more experienced are the users with SNs, the less
vulnerable they are to SE victimisation.
Additionally, in the context of the social network,
Internet experience has been found to predict pre-
cautionary behaviour, and further causes greater
sensitivity to associated risks in using Facebook
(Van Schaik et al. 2018). Thus, years of experience
in using the network could increase the individual’s
awareness of the risk associated with connecting
with strangers. Accordingly, the present study pos-
tulates that more experienced users would have a
high percentage of connections with known friends
in the network.
 Ha4: Users with a higher level of experience with
social network will be less susceptible to social
engineering attacks (i.e., there will be a negative
relationship).
◦ Hb4: The user’s social network experience
positively influences the user’s connections with
known friends.
Perceptual perspective
People’s risk perception, competence, and cybercrime
experience are the three perceptual factors that are be-
lieved to influence their susceptibility to social engineer-
ing attacks. The strength and direction of these factors’
impact will be discussed as follows.
Risk perception
Facebook users have a different level of risk percep-
tion that might affect their decision in times of risk.
Vishwanath et al. (2016) has described risk perception
as the bridge between user’s previous knowledge
about the expected risk and their competence to deal
with that risk. Many studies have considered perceiv-
ing the risk associated with engaging in online activ-
ities as having a direct influence on avoiding using
online services (Riek et al. 2016) and more import-
antly as decreasing their vulnerability to online threats
(Vishwanath et al. 2016). Facebook users’ perceived
risk of privacy and security threats significantly pre-
dict their strict privacy and security settings (Van
Schaik et al. 2018). Thus, if online users are aware of
the potential risks and their consequences that might
be encountered on Facebook, they will probably avoid
clicking on malicious links and communicating with
strangers on the network. This indicates that risk per-
ception contributes to the user’s competence in deal-
ing with online threats and should lead to a decrease
in susceptibility to SE. Therefore, the following rela-
tionships have been proposed.
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 Ha5: Users with a higher level of risk perception
will be less susceptible to social engineering attacks
(i.e., there will be a negative relationship).
◦ Hb5: The user’s perceived risk positively
influences the user’s competence.
Competence
User competence has been considered an essential de-
terminant of end-user capability to accomplish tasks
in many different fields. In the realm of information
systems, user competence can be defined as the indi-
vidual’s knowledge of the intended technology and
ability to use it effectively (Munro et al. 1997). To
gain insight into user competence in detecting secur-
ity threats in the context of online social networks,
investigating the multidimensional space that deter-
mines this user competence level is fundamental
(Albladi and Weir 2017). The role of user competence
and its dimensions in facilitating the detection of on-
line threats is still a controversial topic in the infor-
mation security field. The dimensions used in the
present study to measure the concept are security
awareness, privacy awareness, and self-efficacy. The
scales used to measure these factors can determine
the level of user competence in evaluating risks asso-
ciated with social network usage.
User competence in dealing with risky situations in
a social network setting is a major predictor of the
user’s response to online threats. When individuals
feel competent to control their information in social
networks, they are found to be less vulnerable to
victimisation (Saridakis et al. 2016). Furthermore,
Self-efficacy, which is one of the user’s competence
dimensions, has been found to play a critical role in
users’ safe and preservative behaviour online (Milne
et al. 2009). People who have confidence in their
ability to protect themselves online as well as having
high-security awareness can be perceived as highly
competent users when facing cyber-attacks (Wright
and Marett 2010). This study hypothesised that
highly competent users are less susceptible to SE
victimisation.
 Ha6: Users with a higher level of competence will
be less susceptible to social engineering attacks (i.e.,
there will be a negative relationship).
Cybercrime experience
Past victimisation is observed as profoundly affecting the
person’s view of happiness and safety in general (Mahu-
teau and Zhu 2016). Also, such unpleasant experience is
inclined to change behaviour, for example, reducing the
likelihood of engagement in online-shopping (Bohme and
Moore 2012) or even increasing antisocial behaviour
(Cao and Lin 2015). Furthermore, previous email
phishing victimisation is claimed to raise user aware-
ness and vigilance and thus prevent them from being
victimised again (Workman 2007). Yet, recent studies
found this claim to be not significant (Iuga et al. 2016;
Wang et al. 2017). As experience with cybercrimes could
also be used as a determinant of people’s weakness in pro-
tecting themselves from such threats.
Experience with cybercrime has been found to in-
crease people’s perceived risk of social network ser-
vices (Riek et al. 2016). Those who are knowledgeable
and have previous experience with online threats could
be assumed to have high-risk perception (Vishwanath
et al. 2016). However, unlike the context of email
phishing, little is known about the role of prior know-
ledge and experiences with cybercrime in preventing
people from being vulnerable to social engineering
attacks in the context of social networks. Thus, this
study proposes that past experience could raise the
user’s risk perception but also could be used as a
predictor of the user’s risk of being victimised again.
To this extent, the following hypotheses have been
assumed.
 Ha7: Users with a previous experience with
cybercrime will be more susceptible to social
engineering attacks (i.e., there will be a positive
relationship).
◦ Hb6: The user’s experience with cybercrime
positively influences the user’s perceived risk.
Socio-emotional perspective
Little is known regarding the impact that this per-
spective has on SE victimisation in a SN context.
However, previous research has highlighted the
positive effect of people’s general trust or belief in
their victimisation in email phishing context (Alsea-
doon et al. 2015), which encourages the present
study to investigate more socio-emotional factors
such as the dimensions of user trust and motivation,
in order to consider their possible impact on user’s
risky behaviour.
Trust
Some studies in email phishing (e.g., Alseadoon et al.
2015; Workman 2008) stress that the disposition to
trust is a predictor of the user’s probability of being
deceived by cyber-attacks. In the context of social
networks, trust can be derived from the members’
trust for each other as well as trusting the network
provider. These two dimensions of trust have been in-
dicated to negatively influence people’s perceived risk
in disclosing personal information (Cheung et al.
2015). Trust has also been found to strongly increase
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disclosing personal information among social net-
works users (Beldad and Hegner 2017; Chang and
Heo 2014). With all of this in mind, the present
study hypothesised that trusting the social network
provider as well as other members may cause higher
susceptibility to cyber-attacks.
 Ha8: Users with a higher level of trust will be more
susceptible to social engineering attacks (i.e., there
will be a positive relationship).
Motivation
According to the uses and gratification theory, people
are using the communication technologies that fulfil
their needs (Joinson 2008). Users’ motivation to use
communication technologies must be taken into con-
sideration in order to understand online user behav-
iour. This construct has been acknowledged by
researchers in many fields such as marketing (Chiu
et al. 2014), and mobile technology (Kim et al. 2013)
in order to understand their target users. However,
information security research has limitedly adopted
this view toward understanding the online users’ risky
behaviour. Users can be motivated by different stimuli
to engage in social networks such as entertainment or
information seeking (Basak and Calisir 2015). Add-
itionally, people use Facebook for social reasons such
as maintaining existing relationships and making new
friends (Rae and Lonborg 2015). According to SE vic-
timisation, these motivations can shed light on under-
standing the user’s behaviour at times of risk. For
example, hedonically motivated users who usually
seek enjoyment are assumed to be persuaded to click
on links that provide new games or apps. While socially
motivated users are generally looking to meet new people
online, this makes them more likely to connect with
strangers. This connections with strangers is considered
risky behaviour nowadays (Alqarni et al. 2016). Therefore,
this study predicts that the users’ vulnerability to social
engineering-based attacks will be different based on their
motives to access the social network.
User’s differing motivation to use social networking
sites can explain their attitude online, such as ten-
dency to disclose personal information in social net-
works (Chang and Heo 2014). Additionally, people’s
perceived benefit of network engagement has a posi-
tive impact on their willingness to share their photos
online (Beldad and Hegner 2017). Thus, the present
study assumes that motivated users are more vulner-
able to SE victimisation than others. Additionally, mo-
tivated users could be inclined to be more trusting
when using technology (Baabdullah 2018). This mo-
tivation could lead the individual to spend more time
and show higher involvement in the network (Ross
et al. 2009). This involvement could ultimately lead
motivated individuals to experience or at least be fa-
miliar with different types of cybercrime that could
happen in the network. Hence, the following hypoth-
eses have been postulated.
 Ha9: Users with a higher level of motivation will be
more susceptible to social engineering attacks (i.e.,
there will be a positive relationship).
◦ Hb7: The user’s motivation positively influences
the user’s trust.
◦ Hb8: The user’s motivation positively influences
the user’s level of involvement.
◦ Hb9: The user’s motivation positively influences
the user’s experience with cybercrime.
The previous sub-sections explain the nature and
the directions of the relationships among the con-
structs in the present study. Based on these 18 pro-
posed hypotheses, a novel conceptual model has been
developed and presented in Fig. 1. This conceptual
model relies on three different perspectives which are
believed to predict user behaviour toward SE victim-
isation on Facebook. Developing and validating such a
holistic model gives a clear indication of the contribu-
tion of the present study.
Methods
To evaluate the hypotheses of the conceptual model,
an online-questionnaire was designed using the Qual-
trics online survey tool. The questionnaire incorpo-
rated three main parts starting with questions about
participants’ demographics, followed by questions that
measure the constructs of the proposed model, and fi-
nally, a scenario-based experiment. An invitation email
was sent to a number of faculty staff in two universities,
asking them to distribute the online-questionnaire among
their students and staff.
Sample
Hair et al. (2017) suggested using a sophisticated
guideline that relies on Cohen (1988) recommenda-
tions to calculate the required sample size by using
power estimates. In this case, for 9 predictors (which
is the number of independent variables in the con-
ceptual model) with an estimated medium effect size
of 0.15, the target sample size should be at least 113
to achieve a power level of 0.80 with a significance
level of 0.05 (Soper 2012). In this study, 316 partici-
pants have completed the questionnaire (after the
primary data screening). The descriptive analysis of
participants’ demographics in Table 1 revealed a var-
iety of profiles in terms of gender (39% male, 61%
female), education level, and education major. The
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majority of participants in the study were younger adults
(age 18–24), representing 76% of the total participants.
However, this was expected as the survey was undertaken
in two universities where students considered vital mem-
bers of the higher education environment.
Measurement scales
The proposed conceptual model includes five reflective
factors and four second-order formative constructs which
are risk, competence, trust, and motivation. Repeated indi-
cator approach was used to measure the formative con-
structs values. This method recommends using the same
number of items on all the first order factors in order to
guarantee that all first-order factors have the same weight
on the second order factors and to ensure no weight bias
are existed (Ringle et al. 2012).
The scales used to measure the user habits in SN has
been adopted from (Fogel and Nehmad 2009). To measure
the risk perception dimensions, scales were adapted from
Milne et al. (2009), with some modification and changes to
fit the present study context. The scales used to measure
the three dimensions of user competence were adopted
from Albladi and Weir (2017). Motivation dimension items
were adopted from previous literature (Al Omoush et al.
2012; Basak and Calisir 2015; Orchard et al. 2014; Yang
and Lin 2014). The scale used to measure users’ trust was
adopted with some modification from Fogel and Nehmad
(2009) and Chiu et al. (2006) studies. Appendix 1 presents
a summary of the measurement items.
A scenario-based experiment has been chosen as an
empirical approach to examining users’ susceptibility
to SE victimisation. In such scenario-based experi-
ments, the human is recruited to take a role in
reviewing a set of scripted information which can be
in the form of text or images, then asked to react or
respond to this predetermined information (Rungtusa-
natham et al. 2011). This method is considered suit-
able and realistic for many social engineering studies
Fig. 1 Research Model
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(e.g., (Algarni et al. 2017; Iuga et al. 2016)) due to
the ethical concerns associated with conducting real
attacks. Our scenario-based experiment includes 6 im-
ages of Facebook posts (4 high-risk scenarios, and 2
low-risk scenarios). Each post contains a type of
cyber-attack which has been chosen from the most
prominent cyber-attacks that occur in social networks
(Gao et al. 2011).
In the study model, only high-risk scenarios (which
include phishing, clickjacking with an executable file,
malware, and phishing scam) have been considered to
measure user susceptibility to SE attacks. However,
comparing individuals’ response to the high-risk at-
tacks and their response to the low-risk attacks aims
to examine if users rely on their characteristics when
judging the different scenarios and not on other influ-
encing factors such as visual message triggers (Wang
et al. 2012). Participants were asked to indicate their
response to these Facebook posts, as if they had encoun-
tered them in their real accounts, by rating a number of
statements such as “I would click on this button to read
the file” using a 5-point Likert-scale from 1 “strongly
disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”. Appendix 2 includes a
summary of the scenarios used in this study.
Analysis approach
To evaluate the proposed model, partial least squares
structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM) has been
used due to its suitability in dealing with complex
predictive models that consist in a combination of
formative and reflective constructs (Götz et al. 2010),
even with some limitations regarding data normality
and sample size (Hair et al. 2012). The SmartPLS v3
software package (Ringle et al. 2015) was used to ana-
lyse the model and its associated hypotheses.
To evaluate the study model, three different proce-
dures have been conducted. First, using the PLS-
algorithm to provide standard model estimations such
as path coefficient, the coefficient of determination (R2
values), effect size, and collinearity statistics. Secondly,
using a bootstrapping approach to test the structural
model relationships significance. In such approach, the
collected data sample is treated as the population sam-
ple where the algorithm used a replacement technique
to generate a random and large number of bootstrap sam-
ples (recommended to predefine as 5000) all with the
same amount of cases as the original sample (Henseler
et al. 2009). The present study conducted the bootstrap-
ping procedure with 5000 bootstrap samples, two-tailed
testing, and an assumption of 5% significant level.
Finally, a blindfolding procedure was also used to
evaluate the predictive relevance (Q2) of the structural
model. In this approach, part of the data points are
omitted and considered missing from the constructs’ in-
dicators, and the parameters are estimated using the
remaining data points (Hair et al. 2017). These estima-
tions are then used to predict the missing data points
which will be compared later with the real omitted data
to measure Q2 value. Blindfolding is considered a sample
reuse approach which only applied to endogenous con-
structs (Henseler et al. 2009). Endogenous constructs are
the variables that are affected by other variables in the
study model (Götz et al. 2010), such as user susceptibil-
ity, involvement, and trust.
Results
The part of the conceptual model that includes the rela-
tions between the measurement items and their associ-
ated factors is called the measurement model, while the
hypothesised relationships among the different factors is
called the structural model (Tabachnick and Fidel 2013).
The present study’s measurement model, which includes
all the constructs along with their indicators’ outer load-
ings, can be found in Appendix 3. The result of the
measurement model analysis in Table 2 reveals that the
Table 1 Participants’ demographics
Demographic Frequency Percent Cumulative
Percent
Gender
Male 123 38.9 38.9
Female 193 61.1 100.0
Total 316 100.0
Age
18–24 240 75.9 75.9
25–34 57 18.0 94.0
35–44 14 4.4 98.4
45–55 5 1.6 100.0
Total 316 100.0
Education Level
High school 187 59.2 59.2
Bachelor’s degree 112 35.4 94.6
Master’s degree 14 4.4 99.1
Other, please specify 3 .9 100.0
Total 316 100.0
Major
Computer Science/IT 124 39.2 39.2
Engineering 32 10.1 49.4
Business/Administrative Sciences 38 12.0 61.4
Medical Sciences 5 1.6 63.0
Science 15 4.7 67.7
Humanities and Arts 6 1.9 69.6
Other, please specify 96 30.4 100.0
Total 316 100.0
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Cronbach alpha and the composite reliability were ac-
ceptable for all constructs as they were above the thresh-
old of 0.70. Additionally, since the average variance
extracted (AVE) for all constructs was above the thresh-
old of 0.5 (Hair et al. 2017), the convergent validity of
the model’s reflective constructs was confirmed.
However, in order to assess the model’s predictive
ability and to examine the significance of relationships
between the model’s constructs, the structural model
should be tested. The assessment of the structural model
involves the following testing steps.
Assessing collinearity
This step is vital to determine if there are any collinearity
issues among the predictors of each endogenous construct.
Failing to do so could lead to a biased path coefficient esti-
mation if a critical collinearity issue exists among the con-
struct predictors (Hair et al. 2017). Table 3 presents all the
endogenous constructs (represented by the columns) which
indicate that the variance inflation factor (VIF) values for all
predictors of each endogenous construct (represented by
the rows) are below the threshold of 5. Thus, no collinearity
issues exist in the structural model.
Assessing path coefficients (hypotheses testing)
The path coefficient was calculated using the bootstrap
re-sampling procedure (Hair et al. 2017). This procedure
provides estimates of the direct impact that each con-
struct has on user susceptibility to cyber-attack. The re-
sult of the direct effect test in Table 4 shows that trust
(t = 5.202, p < 0.01) is the highest variable that predicts the
user’s susceptibility to SE victimisation, followed by user’s
involvement (t = 5.002, p < 0.01), cybercrime experience
(t = 3.736, p < 0.01), social network experience (t = − 3.015,
p < 0.01), and percentage of known friends among Face-
book connections (t = − 2.735, p < 0.01). The direct effects
of user competence to deal with threats (t = − 2.474, p <
0.05) and the number of connections (t = − 2.428, p < 0.05)
Table 2 Reliability and convergent validity tests
Constructs Dimensions Cronbach’s Alpha rho_A Composite Reliability Average Variance Extracted (AVE)
Involvement 0.706 0.733 0.870 0.771
Num_Con 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
knownFR 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
SNEXP 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Risk Severity 0.868 0.868 0.919 0.792
Likelihood 0.829 0.834 0.898 0.746
Competence Security 0.715 0.715 0.875 0.778
Privacy 0.710 0.710 0.873 0.775
Self-efficacy 0.762 0.763 0.894 0.808
CCEXP 0.777 0.923 0.843 0.576
Trust TrustM 0.867 0.868 0.919 0.791
TrustP 0.862 0.862 0.916 0.784
Motivation Hedonic 0.727 0.738 0.879 0.784
Social 0.709 0.712 0.873 0.774
Susceptibility 0.877 0.896 0.905 0.616
Table 3 Collinearity assessment (VIF)
CCEXP Competence Involvement KnownFR Risk Susceptibility Trust
CCEXP 1.000 1.125
Competence 1.115
Involvement 1.034 1.170 1.034
KnownFR 1.112
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were relatively small, yet still statistically significant in
explaining the target variable. However, the impact of the
number of connections on users’ susceptibility was nega-
tive which opposes hypothesis (Ha2) that claims that this
relationship is positive.
Most importantly, the result indicated that perceived
risk and motivation have no direct effect on user’s vul-
nerability (p > 0.05). This could be caused by the fact
that both factors are second-order formative variables,
while their first order factors have different direction ef-
fects on user’s susceptibility. As can be seen from the re-
sult of the regression analysis in Table 5, perceived risk
is the second order factor of perceived severity of threat
which has a significant negative effect on the user’s sus-
ceptibility and perceived likelihood of threat which has a
positive impact on user’s susceptibility. Therefore, their
joint effect logically will be not significant, because the
opposite effects of the two dimensions of perceived risk
have cancelled each other. Thus, Ha5 could be consid-
ered as partially supported.
The situation with Motivation is similar as it is also a
second-order formative factor and its first order factors
(hedonic and social) have an opposite effect on users’
susceptibility. Table 5 presents the result of the regres-
sion analysis of first-order factors for the motivation
construct. The result provides evidence that hedonic
motivation is negatively related to the user’s susceptibil-
ity while social motivation is positively associated with
user’s susceptibility. However, when the two dimensions
of motivation were aggregated to create one index to
measure the total effect of user’s motivation (both direct
and indirect), as illustrated in Table 6, the model re-
vealed a significant predictor of users’ susceptibility (t =
3.854, p < 0.01). Thus, the direct effect of motivation on
user susceptibility is statistically rejected, while the total
effect of motivation on users’ susceptibility is statistically
significant and considered one of the strongest predic-
tors in the study model.
Evaluating the total effect of a particular construct
on user susceptibility is considered useful, especially if
the goal of the study is to explore the impact of the
relationships between different drivers to predict one
latent construct (Hair et al. 2017). The total impact
includes both the construct’s direct effect and indirect
effects through mediating constructs in the model.
The total effect analysis in Table 6 revealed that most
of the constructs have a significant overall impact on
user susceptibility (p < 0.05). Although the number of
connections has been proven to have a significant
negative direct effect on user susceptibility, its total
effect when considering all the direct and indirect re-
lationships seems to be very low and not significant
(t = − 0.837, p > 0.05). Furthermore, both the direct
and total effect of perceived risk has been found to
be not substantial (t = − 1.559, p > 0.05).
The rest of the hypotheses (group b) aim to exam-
ine the relationships between the independent con-
structs of the study model, which will be tested
according to estimates of the path coefficient be-
tween the related constructs. Table 7 shows that all
nine hypotheses are statistically significant (p < 0.05).
This also shows the most substantial relationship
was between social network experience and the per-
centage of known friends among Facebook connec-
tions (t = 6.091, p < 0.01), followed by the favourable
impact motivation and level of involvement have on
increasing users trust (with t-value = 4.821, and t-
value = 3.914, respectively).
Table 4 Path coefficient results (significance testing- group a)
Hypo Relationship Std. Beta STDEV T-value P-value 95% Confidence interval
Ha1 Involvement- > Susceptibility 0.222 0.063 5.002 0.000** 0.098 0.344
Ha2 Num-Con - > Susceptibility −0.100 0.041 2.428 0.015a −0.181 −0.019
Ha3 KnownFR - > Susceptibility −0.127 0.047 2.735 0.006** −0.222 −0.037
Ha4 SNEXP - > Susceptibility −0.163 0.054 3.015 0.003** −0.268 − 0.053
Ha5 Risk - > Susceptibility − 0.058 0.051 1.142 0.254 −0.157 0.041
Ha6 Competence - > Susceptibility −0.125 0.050 2.474 0.013* −0.224 −0.029
Ha7 CCEXP - > Susceptibility 0.222 0.059 3.736 0.000** 0.105 0.340
Ha8 Trust - > Susceptibility 0.286 0.055 5.202 0.000** 0.177 0.392
Ha9 Motivation - > Susceptibility 0.015 0.043 0.346 0.729 −0.068 0.099
Significant at ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; a statistically significant but in the opposite direction to that hypothesised
Table 5 Regression analysis of perceived risk and motivation
dimensions
Factors Dimensions Std. Beta t Sig.
Perceived Risk Severity −.146 −2.446 .015
Likelihood .117 1.958 .051
Motivation Hedonic −.080 −1.423 .156
Social .319 5.680 .000
Dependent Variable: Susceptibility
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Furthermore, motivation (t = 3.640, p < 0.01) and the
number of connections (t = 3.106, p < 0.01) are two factors
found to increase users’ level of involvement in the net-
work. Level of involvement also plays a notable role in rais-
ing people’s previous experience with cybercrime (t = 2.532,
p < 0.05), while past cybercrime expertise significantly in-
creases people’s perceived risk associated with using Face-
book (t = 2.968, p < 0.01). Nevertheless, the contribution of
perceived risk in raising user competence level to deal with
online threats was not very strong, although considered sta-
tistically significant (t = 2.241, p < 0.05).
Finally, there was no significant difference with regard
to the user characteristics that affect people’s susceptibil-
ity or resistance to the high-risk scenarios and low-risk
scenarios. This means that participants rely on their per-
ceptions and experience to judge those scenarios.
The coefficient of determination - R2
The coefficient of determination is a traditional criterion
that is used to evaluate the structural model’s predictive
power. In this study, this coefficient measure will repre-
sent the joint effect of all the model variables in explaining
the variance in people’s susceptibility to SE attacks. Ac-
cording to Hair et al. (2017), the acceptable R2 value is
hard to determine as it might vary depending on the study
discipline and the model complexity. Cohen (1988) has
suggested a rule of thumb to assess the R2 values for
models with several independent variables which are: 0.26,
0.13, and 0.02 to be considered substantial, moderate, and
weak respectively. Table 8 illustrates the coefficient of de-
termination for the endogenous variables in the study
model. The R2 values indicate that the nine prediction var-
iables together have substantial predictive power and ex-
plain 33.5% of the variation in users’ susceptibility to SE
attacks. Furthermore, users’ involvement and motivation
combined effect on users’ trust is considered moderate as
it explains 13.2% of the variation in users’ trust.
Predictive relevance Q2
To measure the model’s predictive capabilities, a blindfold-
ing procedure has been used to obtain the model’s predict-
ive relevance (Q2 value). Stone-Geisser’s Q2 value, which is
a measure to assess how well a model predicts the data of
omitted cases, should be higher than zero in order to indi-
cate that the path model has a cross-validated predictive
relevance (Hair et al. 2017). Table 8 presents results of the
predictive relevance test and shows that all of the en-
dogenous constructs in the research model have pre-
dictive relevance greater than zero, which means that
the model has appropriate predictive ability.
Table 6 Total effects significance testing results
Hypo Relationship Std. Beta STDEV T-value P-value 95% Confidence interval Sig.?
Ha1 Involvement - > Susceptibility 0.320 0.064 5.002 0.000 0.188 0.441 Yes
Ha2 Num-Con - > Susceptibility −0.037 0.044 0.837 0.403 −0.122 0.050 No
Ha3 KnownFR - > Susceptibility −0.127 0.047 2.735 0.006 −0.224 −0.041 Yes
Ha4 SNEXP - > Susceptibility −0.201 0.050 4.028 0.000 −0.302 −0.105 Yes
Ha5 Risk - > Susceptibility −0.078 0.050 1.559 0.119 −0.176 0.024 No
Ha6 Competence - > Susceptibility −0.125 0.050 2.474 0.013 −0.218 −0.023 Yes
Ha7 CCEXP - > Susceptibility 0.208 0.059 3.552 0.000 0.090 0.322 Yes
Ha8 Trust - > Susceptibility 0.286 0.055 5.202 0.000 0.180 0.395 Yes
Ha9 Motivation - > Susceptibility 0.173 0.045 3.854 0.000 0.082 0.257 Yes
Table 7 Path coefficient results (significance testing- group b)
Hypo Relationship Std. Beta STDEV T-value P-value 95% Confidence interval
Hb1 Involvement - > CCEXP 0.170 0.067 2.532 0.011* 0.031 0.295
Hb2 Involvement - > Trust 0.219 0.056 3.914 0.000** 0.105 0.327
Hb3 Num-Con - > Involvement 0.197 0.063 3.106 0.002** 0.080 0.324
Hb4 SNEXP - > KnownFR 0.302 0.050 6.091 0.000** 0.201 0.394
Hb5 Risk - > Competence 0.165 0.074 2.241 0.025* 0.020 0.311
Hb6 CCEXP - > Risk 0.179 0.060 2.968 0.003** 0.062 0.294
Hb7 Motivation - > Trust 0.253 0.053 4.821 0.000** 0.150 0.353
Hb8 Motivation - > Involvement 0.166 0.046 3.640 0.000** 0.078 0.256
Hb9 Motivation - > CCEXP 0.154 0.055 2.795 0.005** 0.046 0.264
Significant at ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
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Model fit
Hair et al. (2017) and Henseler et al. (2014) have recom-
mended using SRMR and RMStheta as indices to test a
model’s goodness of fit. While, SRMR represents the dis-
crepancy between the observed correlations and the
model’s implied correlations where its cut-point value
should be less than 0.08 (Hu and Bentler 1998), RMStheta
value of less than 0.12 represents an appropriate model
fit (Hair et al. 2017; Henseler et al. 2014). Normed Fit
Index (NFI) is an incremental model fit evaluation ap-
proach which compares the structural model with a null
model of entirely uncorrelated variables, whereby an NFI
value of more than 0.90 represents good model fit (Ben-
tler and Bonett 1980). Additionally, Dijkstra and Hense-
ler (2015), recommend using the squared euclidean
distance (dLS) and the geodesic distance (dG) as mea-
sures to assess model fit by comparing the distance be-
tween the sample covariance matrix and a structured
covariance matrix. Comparing the original values of dLS
and dG with their confidence intervals could indicate a
good model fit if their values are less than the upper
bound of the 95% confidence interval.
Table 9 illustrates the result of the model fit indices
that was obtained from the SmartPLS report. The empir-
ical test of the structural model revealed a good model
fit as the SRMR value was 0.05, the RMStheta value was
0.099, the NFI was 0.858, which, if rounded, will be 0.9,
and the values of dLS and dG were less than the upper
bound of their confidence interval. Thereby, the results
of all the considered model fit indices reflect a satisfac-
tory model fit when considering the complexity of the
present study model.
Demographic variables effect
One of the present study goals is to examine if specific
users’ demographics (age, gender, education, and major)
are associated with users’ susceptibility to social engin-
eering attacks. To explore this relationship, regression
analysis, as well as variance tests such as t-test and
ANOVA test, have been conducted. Table 10 summa-
rises these tests results.
Gender has been found to affect the user’s susceptibil-
ity to SE victimisation (Std. beta = 0.133, p < 0.05) and
the t-test indicates that women are more vulnerable to
victimisation (t(271.95) = 2.415, p < 0.05). Also, the user’s
major has a significant effect on the user’s vulnerability
(Std. beta = 0.112, p < 0.05). When comparing the
groups’ behaviour via ANOVA test, users who are spe-
cialised in technical majors such as computer and engin-
eering have been indicated as less susceptible to social
engineering attacks than those specialised in humanities
and business (F(6) = 5.164, p < 0.001). Furthermore, the
results show that age has no significant impact on user
vulnerability (Std. beta = 0.096, p > 0.05). However, when
comparing the means of age groups, it can be seen that
younger adults (M = 1.97, SD = 0.99) are less susceptible
than older adults (M = 2.56, SD = 0.92). Moreover, the
educational level has no significant impact on users’ vul-
nerability as revealed by the result of the regression ana-
lysis (Std. beta = 0.068, p > 0.05).
Discussion
Facebook users’ involvement level is revealed in the present
study to have a strong significant effect on their susceptibil-
ity to SE victimisation. This finding confirms the results of
previous research (Saridakis et al. 2016; Vishwanath 2015).
Since most social network users are highly involved in on-
line networks, it is hard to generalise that all involved
people are vulnerable. However, high involvement affects
other critical factors in the present model, i.e., experience
with cybercrime and trust, which in turn have powerful im-
pacts on users’ susceptibility to victimisation.
The number of friends has been found to have a direct
negative impact on people’s vulnerability, which is against
what the present study hypothesised, as this relationship
Table 8 Coefficient of determination (R2) and predictive relevance (Q2)
Construct R Square R Square Adjusted Interpretation SSO SSE Q2 (=1-SSE/SSO)
Susceptibility 0.335 0.315 substantial 316.00 222.74 0.295
Involvement 0.072 0.066 weak 316.00 297.18 0.060
KnownFR 0.091 0.088 weak 316.00 288.18 0.088
Risk 0.032 0.029 weak 316.00 306.36 0.031
Competence 0.027 0.024 weak 316.00 309.17 0.022
CCEXP 0.062 0.056 weak 316.00 300.16 0.050
Trust 0.132 0.127 Moderate 316.00 277.69 0.121
Table 9 Model fit criterion
Estimated Model 95% Confidence interval
SRMR 0.053 – –
rms Theta 0.099 – –
NFI 0.858 – –
dLS 0.154 0.041 0.155
dG 0.030 0.009 0.031
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had been assumed to be positive in order to concur with
previous claims that large network size makes individuals
more vulnerable to SNs risks (Buglass et al. 2016; Vishwa-
nath 2015). Facebook users seem to accept friend requests
from strangers to expand their friendship network.
Around 48% of the participants in this study stated that
they know less than 10% of their Facebook network per-
sonally. Connecting with strangers on the network has
previously been seen as the first step in falling prey to so-
cial engineering attacks (Vishwanath 2015), while also be-
ing regarded as a measure of risky behaviour on social
networks (Alqarni et al. 2016). A high percentage of
strangers with whom the user is connected can be seen as
a determinant of the user’s low level of suspicion.
Furthermore, social network experience has been found to
significantly predict people’s susceptibility to social engineer-
ing in the present study. People’s ability to detect social net-
work deception has been said to depend on information
communication technology literacy (Tsikerdekis and Zead-
ally 2014). Thus, experienced users are more familiar with
cyber-attacks such as phishing and clickjacking, and easily
detect them. This is further supported by Algarni et al.
(2017), who pointed out that the less time that has elapsed
since the user joined Facebook, the more susceptible he or
she is to social engineering. Yet, their research treated user
experience with social networks as a demographic variable
and did not examine whether this factor might affect other
aspects of user behaviour. For instance, results from the
present study reveal that users who are considered more ex-
perienced in social networks have fewer connections with
strangers (t = 6.091, p < 0.01), which further explains why
they are less susceptible than novice users.
Perception of risk has no direct influence on people’s
vulnerability, but the present study found perceived risk
to significantly increase people’s level of competence to
deal with social engineering attacks. This also accords
with the Van Schaik et al. (2018) study, which found that
Facebook users with high risk perception adopt precau-
tionary behaviours such as restrictive privacy and
security-related settings. Most importantly, perceived
cybercrime risk has also been indicated as influencing
people to take precautions and avoid using online social
networks (Riek et al. 2016).
Measuring user competence levels would contribute to
our understanding of the reasons behind user weakness in
detecting online security or privacy threats. In the present
study, the measure of an individual’s competence level in
dealing with cybercrime was based upon three dimen-
sions: security awareness, privacy awareness, and self-
efficacy. The empirical results show that this competence
measure can significantly predict the individual’s ability to
detect SE attacks on Facebook. Individuals’ perception of
their self-ability to control the content shared on social
network websites has been previously considered a pre-
dictor of their ability to detect social network threats (Sari-
dakis et al. 2016), as individuals who have this confidence
in their self-ability as well as in their security knowledge
seem to be competent in dealing with cyber threats (Flores
et al. 2015; Wright and Marett 2010).
Furthermore, our results accord with the finding of
Riek et al. (2016) that previous cybercrime experience
has a positive and substantial impact on users’ perceived
risk. Yet, this high-risk perception did not decrease
users’ vulnerability in the present study. This could be
because experience and knowledge of the existence of
threats do not need to be reflected in people’s behaviour.
For example, individuals who had previously undertaken
security awareness training still underestimated the im-
portance of some security practices, such as frequent
change of passwords (Kim 2013).
The present research found that people’s trust in the so-
cial network’s provider and members were the strongest
determinants of their vulnerability to social engineering
attacks (t = 5.202, p < 0.01). Previous email phishing re-
search (e.g., Alseadoon et al. 2015; Workman 2008) has
also stressed that people’s disposition to trust has a signifi-
cant impact on their weakness in detecting phishing
emails. Yet, little was known about the impact of trust in
providers and other members of social networks on peo-
ple’s vulnerability to cyber-attacks. These two types of
Table 10 Demographic factors impact on user susceptibility to SE
Demographic
Variable
Regression Analysis Variance Test Means
Std. Beta t Sig. t-value/ f-value Sig.
Gender 0.133 2.381 0.018 −2.415 0.016 Male Female
1.87 2.14
Age 0.096 1.714 0.088 1.932 0.124 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–55
1.97 2.28 1.95 2.56
Education 0.068 1.201 0.231 0.919 0.432 High school Bachelor Master Other
1.98 2.12 1.93 2.7
Major 0.112 1.990 0.047 5.164 < 0.001 Comp/IT Eng Bus Med Sci Hum Other
1.78 1.89 2.72 2.46 2.23 2.57 2.05
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trust have been found to decrease users’ perception of the
risks associated with disclosing private information on
SNs (Cheung et al. 2015). Similarly, trusting social net-
work providers to protect members’ private information
has caused Facebook users (especially females) to be more
willing to share their photos in the network (Beldad and
Hegner 2017). These findings draw attention to the huge
responsibility that social network providers have to pro-
tect their users. In parallel, users should be encouraged to
be cautious about their privacy and security.
People’s motivation to use social networks has no dir-
ect influence on their vulnerability to SE victimisation,
as evidenced by the results of this study. Yet, this motiv-
ation significantly affects different essential aspects of
user behaviour and perception such as user involvement,
trust, and previous experience with cybercrime, which in
turn substantially predict user vulnerability. This result
accords with the claim that people’s motivation of using
SNs increase their disclosure of private information (Bel-
dad and Hegner 2017; Chang and Heo 2014).
Theoretical and practical implications
Most of the proposed measures to mitigate SE threats in
the literature (e.g. (Fu et al. 2018; Gupta et al. 2018)) are
focused on technical solutions. Despite the importance
and effectiveness of these proposed technical solutions,
social engineers try to exploit human vulnerabilities;
hence we require solutions that understand and guard
against human weaknesses. Given the limited number of
studies that investigate the impact of human characteris-
tics on predicting vulnerability to social network security
threats, the present study can be considered useful, hav-
ing critical practical implications that should be ac-
knowledged in this section.
The developed conceptual model shows an acceptable
prediction ability of people’s vulnerability to social engin-
eering in social networks as revealed by the results of this
study. The proposed model could be used by information
security researchers (or researchers from different fields)
to predict responses to different security-oriented risks.
For instance, decision-making research could benefit from
the proposed framework and model as they indicate new
perspectives on user-related characteristics that could
affect decision-making abilities in times of risk.
Protecting users’ personal information is an essential
element in promoting sustainable use of social networks
(Kayes and Iamnitchi 2017). SN providers should pro-
vide better privacy rules and policies and develop more
effective security and privacy settings. A live chat threat
report must be essential in SN channels in order to re-
duce the number of potential victims of specific threat-
ening posts or accounts. Providing security and privacy-
related tools could also help increase users’ satisfaction
with social networks.
Despite the importance of online awareness campaigns as
well as the rich training programs that organisations adopt,
problems persist because humans are still the weakest link
(Aldawood and Skinner 2018). Changing beliefs and behav-
iour is a complex procedure that needs more research.
However, the present study offers clear insight into specific
individual characteristics that make people more vulnerable
to cybercrimes. Using these characteristics to design train-
ing programs is a sensible approach to the tuning of secur-
ity awareness messages. Similarly, our results will be helpful
in conducting more successful training programs that in-
corporate the identified essential attributes from the pro-
posed perspectives, as educational elements to increase
people’s awareness. While these identified factors might re-
flect a user’s weak points, the factors could also be targeted
by enforcing behavioural security strategies in order to miti-
gate social engineering threats.
The developed conceptual model could be used in the
assessment process for an organisation’s employees, es-
pecially those working in sensitive positions. Also, the
model and associated scales could be of help in employ-
ment evaluation tests, particularly in security-critical in-
stitutions, since the proposed model may predict those
weak aspects of an individual that could increase his/her
vulnerability to social engineering.
A semi-automated security advisory system
One of the practical usefulness of the proposed prediction
model can be demonstrated through integrating this model
in a semi-automated advisory system (Fig. 2). Based on the
idea of user profiling, this research has established a prac-
tical solution which can semi-automatically predict users’
vulnerability to various types of social engineering attacks.
The designed semi-automated advisory system could be
used as an approach with which to classify social network
users according to their vulnerability type and level after
completing an assessment survey. The local administrator
can determine the threshold and the priority for each type of
attack based on their knowledge. Then, the network pro-
vider could send awareness posts to each segment that target
the particular group’s needs. Assessing social network users
and segmenting them based on their behaviour and vulner-
abilities is essential in order to design relevant advice that
meets users’ needs. Yet, since social engineering techniques
are rapidly changing and improving, the attack scenarios that
are used in the assessment step could be updated from time
to time. The registered users in the semi-automated advisory
system also need to be reassessed regularly in order to ob-
serve any changes in their vulnerability.
Significant outcomes were noted with practical impli-
cations for how social network users could be assessed
and segmented based on their characteristics, behaviour,
and vulnerabilities, in turn facilitating their protection
from such threats by targeting them with relevant advice
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and education that meets users’ needs. This system is
considered cost and time effective, as integrating individ-
uals’ needs with the administrator’s knowledge of exist-
ing threats could avoid the overhead and inconvenience
of sending blanket advice to all users.
Conclusion
The study develops a conceptual model to test the factors
that influence social networks users’ judgement of social
engineering-based attacks in order to identify the weakest
points of users’ detection behaviour, which also helps to
predict vulnerable individuals. Proposing such a novel
conceptual model helped in bridging the gap between the-
ory and practice by providing a better understanding of
how to predict vulnerable users. The findings of this re-
search indicate that most of the considered user character-
istics influence users’ vulnerability either directly or
indirectly. This research also contributes to the existing
knowledge of social engineering in social networks, par-
ticularly augmenting the research area of predicting user
behaviour toward security threats by proposing a new in-
fluencing perspective, the socio-emotional, which has not
been satisfactorily reported in the literature before, as a di-
mension affecting user vulnerability. This new perspective
could also be incorporated to investigate user behaviour
in several other contexts.
Using a scenario-based experiment instead of conduct-
ing a real attack study is one of the main limitations of the
present study but was considered unavoidable due to eth-
ical considerations. However, the selected attack scenarios
were designed carefully to match recent and real social
engineering-based attacks on Facebook. Additionally, the
present study was undertaken in full consciousness of the
fact that when measuring people’s previous experience
with cybercrime, some participants might be unaware of
their previous victimisation and so might respond inaccur-
ately. In order to mitigate this limitation, different types of
SE attacks have been considered in the scale that measures
previous experience with cybercrime, such as phishing,
identity theft, harassment, and fraud.
Furthermore, this research has focused only on aca-
demic communities as all the participants in this study
were students, academic, and administrative staff of two
universities. This could be seen as a limitation as the result
may not reflect the behaviour of the general public. The
university context is important however, and cyber-
criminals have targeted universities recently due to their
importance in providing online resources to their students
and community (Öğütçü et al. 2016). Additionally, while
several steps have been taken to ensure the inclusion of all
influential factors in the model, it is not feasible to guaran-
tee that all possibly influencing attributes are included in
this study. Further efforts are needed in this sphere, as
predicting human behaviour is a complex task.
The conceptual study model could be used to test user
vulnerability to different types of privacy or security hazards
associated with the use of social networks: for instance, by
measuring users’ response to the risk related to loose priv-
acy restrictions, or to sharing private information on the
network. Furthermore, investigating whether social net-
works users have different levels of vulnerability to privacy
and security associated risks is another area of potential fu-
ture research. The proposed model’s prediction efficiency
could be compared to different types of security and privacy
threats. This comparison would offer a reasonable future
direction for researchers to consider. Future research could
focus more on improving the proposed model by giving
perceived trust greater attention, as this factor was the
highest behaviour predictor in the present model. The
novel conceptualisation of users’ competence in the con-
ceptual model has proved to have a profound influence on
their behaviour toward social engineering victimisation, a
finding which can offer additional new insight for future
investigations.
Fig. 2 A Semi-Automated Advisory System
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Appendix 1
Table 11 Measurement items
Construct Dimensions Questions Measurement items
Perceived Risk Severity of threat • Please choose the best answer in each
statement that indicates the extent to
which a statement is true for you: (from
Strongly agree to Strongly disagree)
• I believe that losing my data privacy while
using Facebook would be a severe problem
for me (ST2)
• I believe that having my messages and chats
being seen or listened to in Facebook would
be a severe
problem for me (ST3)
• I believe that losing my financial information while
using Facebook would be harmful for me (ST4)
Likelihood of threat • Answer the following questions according
to your beliefs, attitudes, and experiences:
(from Extremely Likely to Extremely Unlikely)
• How likely is it for your financial information to
be stolen in Facebook? (LT1)
• How likely is it that your identity can be stolen
in Facebook? (LT2)
• How likely is it for your privacy to be invaded
without your knowledge while using Facebook? (LT3)
Competence Security • Please choose the best answer in each
statement that indicates the extent to
which a statement is true for you: (from
Strongly agree to Strongly disagree)
• I use password for my Facebook account
different from the passwords I use to access
other sites (SA2)
• I use a specific new email for my Facebook
account different from my personal or work
email (SA4)
Privacy • Please choose the best answer in each
statement that indicates the extent to
which a statement is true for you: (from
Strongly agree to Strongly disagree)
• I don’t share personal information on Facebook
such as birthdate, phone number, workplace or
address (PA3)
• I don’t share my current or future location on
Facebook for example, images for my current
vacation, or plans for future vacation (PA4)
Self-efficacy • Please choose the best answer in each
statement that indicates the extent to
which a statement is true for you: (from
Strongly agree to Strongly disagree)
• I have the knowledge and the ability to secure
my Facebook account by adjusting the account
settings (SEF3)
• I have the ability to protect myself from any
online threats while using Facebook (SEF4)
Past experience with
cybercrime
• How often have you experienced or been
a victim of the following incidents? (Rate
each statement from always to never)
• Identity theft (somebody stealing your personal data
and impersonating you, e.g. Open SN account with
your name, or Shopping under your name) (PE1_It)
• Phishing (Received emails fraudulently asking for
money or personal details, including banking or
payment information) (PE2_Ph)
• Online fraud where goods purchased were not
delivered, counterfeit or not as advertised (PE3_OF)
• Harassment, cyber-bullying (Received Harassing
messages, inappropriate comments, or other
persistent behaviours that endangers your safety)
(PE4_Har)
Trust Trust Provider • Please choose the best answer that
indicates how much you agree with the
following statements: (from Strongly
agree to Strongly disagree)
• Facebook is a trustworthy social network (TP1)
• I can count on Facebook to protect my
privacy (TP2)
• I can count on Facebook to protect my personal
information from unauthorized use (TP3)
Trust Members • Please choose the best answer that
indicates how much you agree with the
following statements: (from Strongly
agree to Strongly disagree)
• Facebook Members will not take advantage
of others even when the opportunity arises (TM1)
• Facebook Members are truthful in dealing with
one another (TM3)
• Facebook Members will always keep the promises
they make to one another (TM4)
Motivation Hedonic • What are your main reasons of using
social networks? (Rate each statement
from Strongly agree to Strongly disagree)
• To pass the time (HM1)
• Using social networks are enjoyable and
entertaining (HM2)
Social • What are your main reasons of using
social networks? (Rate each statement
from Strongly agree to Strongly disagree)
• To keep in touch with friends and family (SM1)
• To maintain my popularity and prestige among
peers (SM3)
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Appendix 2
Table 12 A Summary of the social engineering scenarios
Type of Trick Message Risk-level
1. Phishing – requesting sensitive information such as
the user’s email and real name in order to win an
iPhone 7 or £100 voucher.
Winner picked tonight
Like = free iphone7
Comment = £100 voucher
To contact you if you win,
Enter your email and name here http://bit.ly/2gno8tj
High
2. Clickjacking with an executable file- a post about a
shocking and a very important document that is shown
in the post as a pdf file with the mouse pointer positioned
on the link and the actual URL in the status bar indicates
that the document is an executable file.
I don’t want to believe. I just read this document. You
must read it. it is very important for all public. Please
someone tell me that is a lie.
High
3. Clickjacking- a post that includes a video that direct the
user to an ambiguous link. However, this type of link is a
low-risk since the link could be either a malicious link or a
safe link; it is not clear and not safe to risk and clicks in
such links.
Video: The most shocking viedo you will every watch!! Low
4. Malware- offering an application that allows users to call
and message their friends free of charge if they ignore the
warning message and give permission to the application to
access their profile and contact information.
Download this app. It’s works perfect for calling out or
messaging. All you need is Wi-Fi.
High
5. Phishing scam- a threatening message pretended to be from
Facebook support team asking the user to re-confirm his/her
account or blocking the account. The link in the message is the
original Facebook site, but the actual URL displayed in the status
bar is http://cut.uk/Facebookconfirm-login, which is apparently a
phishing site.
Your account is at risk!
Please re-confirm your account to avoid plocking, if you are
the original owner of this account.
Please re-confirm you account by following this link here:
https://www.facebook.com/xsrn
if you don’t confirm our system will automatically block your
account and will not be able to use it again.
High
6. Click on a safe link- YouTube video that shows recent news, the
link appears in the bottom status bar shows a YouTube short link.
Such short URLs could be either malicious links or safe links.
OMG..Tsunami hitting again Low
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